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The

Three Case Studies

Politics of
Industrialization

Eve

Weinbaum, Ph.D.

S.

This article analyzes the grassroots efforts of the working

and unemployed poor of
economy in an

three Appalachian communities to improve their towns devastated
'

era of rapid economic change

and

globalization. While all three were beset by

plant closings, their forms of political mobilization, both before and after the shutdown, differed. Each group of workers mounted a communitywide campaign de-

signed to convince the company to

stay, to

induce local government action, to

re-

pay and benefits due, and to influence state legislation and economic development policy. Mobilization in the wake of a plant closing is rather extraordinary,
especially in isolated, low-income rural areas. Why did it occur in these communities, and what were its consequences for the participants and for the state? First,
each group's ultimate failure to influence an economic outcome and policy reveals
ceive

the grim prospects for meaningful local democratic politics in a global economy.
But second, the mobilization in two of the three cases succeeded in transforming
the participants and the local community.

There is
The

something new and disturbing about current economic

New

York Times.

1

In the 1990s, journalists and social scientists of

cal persuasions are observing troubling trends

nomic

issues, especially

among

out the American middle class.

The changes of the
larly severe. Partly

late

all politi-

and widespread anxiety regarding eco-

the unemployed and the poor, but increasingly throughThe changes that accompany downsizing and

deindustrialization are affecting a broad group of workers
tion workers to high-level

afflictions," says

managers —

— from

blue-collar produc-

in nearly every region of the country.

1980s and early 1990s in

New

England have been particu-

because of decreases in defense-related spending, the Northeast has

seen what one economist has called "dramatic employment reductions ... the most
severe recession the region has faced since the Great Depression." 2

A

disproportionate

share of these reductions has been caused by business failures or plant closings in a
variety of

economic

sectors. Closings in

New

England, as elsewhere in the nation, have

had serious, undesirable implications for the regional economy. Firms

that cease to exist

cannot rehire workers in periods of economic recovery, banks whose business customers
default

become

less likely to finance

new

ventures,

and communities are decimated

as

laid-off workers disperse. Accordingly, economists argue that high rates of plant clos-

ings tend to have lasting repercussions and to slow eventual economic recovery. 3

"global

The
economy" has had an obvious and well-documented impact on Americans'

Eve

S. Weinbaum, a political scientist, is education and political director for the southern
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standard of living and economic expectations, but
I

it

also has affected our politics.

analyze the political changes that accompany deindustrialization in cities and rural

areas

all

across the United States by closely examining three plant closings in Appala-

chian Tennessee. Although local conditions and regional differences are important,
these communities provide a useful

around economic change

in

microcosm

any region.

and the Midwest for the low wages and
Tennessee are

like

now moving

on.

Many

for the study of political mobilization

of the firms that once

less stringent regulations

Some

left

New

England

of southern regions

are going overseas in a continuing quest to

reduce production costs, others are moving between states and counties to benefit from

economic development policies and incentives. Whatever the reason, capital mobility is
becoming more prevalent than ever, leading to serious consequences for every region of
the United States.

All three subject communities analyzed experienced plant closings between 1988

and 1993. The workers in each

plant, deciding to protest the

shutdown

in

some way,

undertook an effort to improve their community's devastated economy in an era of rapid

economic change and globalization. Different forms of

political mobilization

took place

Each
community mounted a communitywide campaign to prevent the plant from closing, to
induce local government action, to acquire the pay and benefits due them, or to lobby
for state or federal legislation. Such mobilization in the wake of a plant closing is rather
extraordinary, and I examine the reasons for its occurrence and its results in all three
either before the closing (with the

hope of preventing

it)

or afterward, or both.

cases.
I

discuss the mobilization in several stages, the

the shutdowns.

It is

striking that, although the

and time

notification

to prepare, this

made

first

covering the circumstances of

workers in these plants had more or

little

difference;

all

the closings

came

less

as a

shock and a hardship. The three factories are in small towns in rural areas, and the
workers knew that once laid

off,

finding work, except at fast-food restaurants, cleaning

houses, or through temporary agencies, would not be easy.

The second

stage

mendously between

is

the mobilization campaign.

cases. Is the

problem framed

lenge to the structure of the American
is

The nature of

the effort varies tre-

as a single plant's failure or as a chal-

economy? Besides

the breadth of the issue, there

the question of the nature of the target of the activity: the plant manager, the corpora-

tion, the local, state, or federal

government.

I

show

that these are not given parameters

but the choices of the leaders in the early stages of a campaign.

The

third stage involves the nature of the coalition that

framed. To be successful, organizers must recruit others

examples. Their ability to do

this

depends on

many

forms around the issue as

who can

it is

provide resources and

factors, including the current

degree

of organization in the workplace and in the community and between the two, as well as
the leadership and organizing skills of those involved in the drive.
Finally,

argue that the success or failure of each mobilizing effort must not be

I

judged by economic outcomes alone.

When

small, rural, economically and politically

marginalized groups confront national and international institutions on the direction of
the global economy, positive material outcomes are a rarity.

At

least as important are

the changes in the individual participants and in their communities brought about

experience of political mobilization. Through this process, participants
stand

many

by the

to under-

own power and the power of colpower relations in their communities; their relationship to authority and
stand up for what is right; the "economy"; national debate of public policy

factors in an entirely different light: their

lective action;

the ability to

come

20

issues; politics

and the role of elected

officials;

people across the country and the world.

I

and

their

commonality with working

based the description and analysis of the

and of

striking differences in their perceptions of their experiences,
ally,

my

on

sixty in-depth interviews,

with employees in
tial

all

politics

more gener-

conducted October 1993 through February 1994,

three communities. These transformations demonstrate the poten-

of grassroots organizing to generate political change.

These cases show

that organized

and sustained struggle requires many

factors, in-

cluding various types of resources, preexisting community networks, and perhaps most
important, leadership.

I

show

that the differences in the types of issues defined, the

campaigns waged, the coalitions formed, and the changes

in both understandings

and

material conditions are directly related to the type of political organizing that character-

ized each effort.

Case

Greenbrier Industries

1:

The more than

hundred Greenbrier Industries employees

five

Fourth of July vacation in the

summer

who

returned from their

of 1993 found a rude surprise awaiting them. The

by a telephone message instructing them not
disregarded the message or, certain it could
not be true, went to the factory to find out more about what was happening. There they
found supervisors and plant managers who were equally confused. The workers were
Clinton, Tennessee, workers were greeted

to report to

work

the following day.

told only that they

work.

When

Some

would receive word

in a

week

as to

when

one knew what

to expect, but there

was no work.

Little

by

ered the truth: Greenbrier would not reopen. Even worse,

had for months been
bounced.

Many

months-old

bills

secretly siphoning off funds.

little,

it

come back to
same response. No

they should

they checked in the following week, they received the

the employees discov-

appeared that the company

Most workers'

final

paychecks had

had not been paid, suppliers had stopped deliveries when
unpaid, and the company was behind on its obligations. On

payroll taxes

were

left

July 28, 1993, Greenbrier Industries quietly filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy at

its

New

Jersey headquarters.

many

Hiring as

as

650 people, Greenbrier

Industries

had been the second

largest

employer in Clinton, a town of only 8,000. An apparel plant owned by Northerners, it
was a rather typical rural southern factory employing mainly women to sit in front of

The pay was low; in 1994, most new workers
were paid $4.50 an hour. More experienced workers hoped to be placed in piece-rate
jobs in which they could be rewarded for extraordinary speed. But when a worker or a
group became too efficient at a particular task
when their earnings neared $7.00 or
assorted sewing machines for long days.

— engineers appeared

—

new time studies and reevaluate
downward. Sewing machine operators did not get rich at Greenbrier, yet
workers maintain that they liked working there. Treated well, they considered them-

even $8.00 an hour

to conduct

the piece rate

selves part of the Greenbrier "family."

The
in clear

by the river, just two blocks from City Hall and
view of the Anderson County courthouse, could not have been a more centrally

large old brick factory building

It drew workers from very poor rural Campbell, Union, and Roane
most of the employees lived nearby, and nearly everyone in Clinton seems

located landmark.
counties, but
to

have had

at least

one

relative, friend, or

neighbor

who worked

at Greenbrier.

The

twenty-two-year-old company had a rather checkered past. Plagued by investigations

and allegations of corruption, Greenbrier had been shifted among various interrelated
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grow and thrive. Greenbrier's main
was the U.S. government. The plant,
which was awarded Department of Defense contracts, had started by making body bags,
owners for many years, yet had continued

customer

—

for years

it

to

had been the only one

—

eventually branching out into parkas, bulletproof vests, camouflage suits, tents, windbreakers, and dress coats.

The workload had been extremely heavy during Operation
many more workers, but everyone put in

Desert Storm, and managers not only hired

overtime hours, sometimes as long as sixteen-hour shifts several days in a row. But
business had slowed so that workers were being shifted around and sometimes laid

Everyone seemed

to

know

assure workers that everything
entire Clinton

off.

was bad, but management had continued to
right. The sudden bankruptcy was a shock to the

that business

was

all

community.

For many workers, the devastation of suddenly being faced with no work and no
income was intensified when they learned the details of the bankruptcy. Many were
burdened by the most serious problem of owing huge hospitalization bills. While they
approxiwere employed, the workers had continued to contribute weekly payments
for health insurance. But
mately $30 a week from a gross salary of less than $200
without informing anyone, the company had stopped paying their bills six months previously. Greenbrier, a self-insured business, had not paid medical bills for half a year.
Some workers owed up to $40,000 in hospital bills, despite the assurance of the company, to both the workers and the doctors, that it would cover all services, including
major surgery. By the fall, the workers were being hounded by collection agencies on
behalf of hospitals, and some began to receive notices that their wages, if they had any,
would be garnisheed to pay Greenbrier's outstanding bills.
Many workers had also contributed to a 401 (k) pension plan, some up to 15 or 20
percent of their monthly wages, on the promise that their personal contributions were
being matched by those of their employer. After the company declared bankruptcy,
these employees found that not only had there been no matching payments, but their
own contributions had been seized by the bank. Workers watched helplessly as their
livelihood and their entire savings disappeared.

—

—

The Greenbrier Workers Committee
it was clear that the plant was permanently closed, the Greenbrier workers called
a meeting at which almost three hundred people appeared. Comparing notes, they discovered common ground: everyone had been promised that they would return to work
after the summer vacation; nobody's hospital and doctor bills had been paid for at least
six months; no one knew what had become of their 401 (k) savings. One by one, outraged workers stood up to tell their stories. The group, becoming increasingly angry,
discussed possible courses of action. Because the company had declared bankruptcy, no
one was optimistic about the plant's reopening. Someone pointed out that although the
workers' bills had not been paid and many of their final paychecks had bounced, the
managers and office staff were still working. So the group decided to begin picketing
twice a week. They demanded that the company dedicate whatever money remained not
to office staff in an empty factory but to repayment of its debts to the workers. The

When

activists also

decided to continue meeting in the county courthouse every Thursday

evening to share information and to make further plans.

Although the decision to picket was spontaneous, it was taken seriously by the atMore than one hundred workers, armed with angry picket signs, arrived the

tendees.

following Saturday morning and led a lively parade in front of the factory. The local

22

press

showed

up, and even the Knoxville newspaper and television stations took notice,

for picket lines are an unusual sight in the quiet

Cumberland

attention to their plight, the workers told their stories

more

notice.

They

plateau. Energized by this

and attempted

to garner

even

called their senators and representatives and contacted county and

city executives, asking that

an official investigation be undertaken. The federal

officials'

only response was to refer them to the nearest job training and employment offices, and
the local officials claimed that they had no

When

power

a report of the Greenbrier workers'

the Knoxville press, the Tennessee Industrial

A

ested.

coalition of labor,

to intervene.

meeting and picket line appeared in
Renewal Network (TIRN) became inter-

initial

community, church, and environmental groups dedicated

organizing around such economic issues as plant closings,
helping workers in similar situations.

TIRN

TIRN

had been involved

sent a staff organizer,

Tom

Turner, to speak

with the Greenbrier workers to determine whether they would be receptive to his

them

to
in

assist-

and educating people about their rights and opportunities. Turner attended an early meeting, bringing with him two women who had lost their
jobs when their sewing factories closed. They described to the group the hardship of
surviving a plant closing and provided information regarding the various government
programs and what could be expected of each. Following this gathering, Turner continued to attend Greenbrier meetings and picket lines and began to work more closely with
ing

in planning strategies

a group of key leaders. They decided to call themselves the Greenbrier Workers

(GWC),

mittee

The

TIRN.
weeks passed

Com-

elected officers, and formally joined

picket lines and meetings continued, but as

the ex-workers

became

demoralized. They had succeeded in getting the office staff out of the empty plant, but

were given no answers concerning the money due them. The media ceased

to

be

inter-

ested in the stale plant-closing news, and politicians no longer returned phone calls.

Some

of the workers found

less than their previous

new jobs, most

requiring significant

commutes and paying

amounts, and most had no time to continue protesting. Others

By early December, fewer than ten
seemed unlikely that the GWC would continue to exist. The leaders decided to hold one more meeting, in mid-January, to see if
progress had been made in tracking down their 401 (k) and other funds, and to disband
decided that the situation was hopeless and gave up.

people attended a Thursday meeting, and

it

after that.

The Failure of the GWC
At an early meeting the laid-off workers had discussed possible strategies. Understandably, their immediate goal was to secure the money they feared was lost: their final
paychecks, health insurance, and pension savings. Toward this end, Turner suggested
that they contact a lawyer, bringing Rick DeLone, a Knoxville attorney experienced in
bankruptcies to their next meeting. The attorney had spoken with the bankruptcy trustee
in

New

Jersey to ascertain the status of the Greenbrier estate. After listening to the

workers' concerns and needs,

DeLone

presented the bad news. If he were in their shoes,

he told them honestly, he would not spend the time and money either suing Greenbrier
or following up on their claims.

It

would be

prohibitively expensive for the workers to

DeLone said, because it would require repeated trips to the northern New
company headquarters where all its records and the bankruptcy papers were

hire him,

Jersey
filed.

And

it

would be unlikely

Greenbrier's individual owners,

to

pay

off, since the

bankruptcy was complete, and

who reportedly had fled to South America, were protected

by American incorporation laws.
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workers
raising

at the

Some wanted

meeting resisted DeLone's conclusion.

money. They were eager

to prosecute the offenders.

to offer

One woman

to think of

proof of management's wrongdoing

verbalized the certainty of

many concerning

"They knew, probably two, three, four years ago, that they
were running into financial difficulties. There's no doubt in my mind that in this time
frame, they started taking money and putting it into other companies, changing names,
putting it in their own pockets. They really did. And if I had the time, if I had the
money, I could prove this with Greenbrier. But I just don't have the money." She also
explained that their goal in hiring an attorney would not be to win a large settlement but
simply to see justice done. "It wasn't the money that we wanted. I think we would have
been satisfied with an apology. But we never heard from them. It's just horrendous." 4
Another woman described her sense of violation and powerlessness. "When they
claimed bankruptcy, it made me so mad I wanted to die. I said it's like standing on the
courthouse steps being raped, and the police driving by and just waving. You know, they
took our money. And apparently they'd been taking it a long time." 5 A man wondered at
the imbalance of justice he suddenly saw: "It's like, you've let them steal everything
you've got, and there's nothing you can do about it. But now if we
if you or I
go
6
it's just not fair."
out here and steal something, they'll put us in jail. It's just not
Yet this tremendous sense of injustice and anger had no outlet. The workers, unable
to dispute DeLone's conclusions, deferred to his expertise. Certain individuals continued to look for ways to fight rather than to accept their fate passively. Ann Ritter went
to the Anderson County courthouse to see if she could take out a warrant for the plant
the firm's mismanagement.

—

—

.

manager's or the owner's
checks and used
court."

7

She

it

arrest,

because, as she said, "He's took

for his own." But, as she

persisted, calling

.

news

stations

was

told,

.

money

out of our

"He's protected by the bankruptcy

and being interviewed repeatedly about the

Greenbrier situation. She called Senator Jim Sasser's office and sent reams of informa-

no response. Eventually Ritter, who had to take
on three jobs to replace her Greenbrier work, had no more time for protest.
Months later a group of workers reconvened and decided that they should continue to
try to raise awareness about their plight. They were still saddled with huge hospital bills
one was trying to pay off a $38,000 debt at $5.00 a month, which was all he could
afford. They had received no word about their savings money. They were still outraged
and energetic, but after brainstorming awhile, they could think of no real channels by
which they could hope to effect positive changes. They decided to stage a one-day
picket at the county courthouse, to try one last time to move local officials to take up
their case and at least investigate, or preferably to advocate on behalf of the displaced
workers. By then, only about ten workers showed up on the picket line. There was a
palpable sense that their cause had been lost, and that further actions were unlikely and

tion to his aides, but ultimately received

—

probably

futile.

The Greenbrier workers were
dangerous (injury
fingers,

and back

rates,

desolate and

bitter.

Although

their

work was

tedious,

including carpal tunnel syndrome, nerve damage, severed

injuries,

were astronomical) and low-paying, they had been

surpris-

One worker said, "I thoroughly enjoyed my job. I enjoyed learning. And
so many things, I just loved it." 8 Nearly all talked about how terribly they

ingly content.
just learned

would miss their coworkers, about the close relationships they had formed at work.
To many, the most devastating aspect of being laid off was the extreme disrespect
demonstrated in Greenbrier's actions. As one worker explained, "We knew they was in
trouble. We were not surprised they were going to close. We were just surprised at how

24

I

they treated us. That

"I think

we

it

it

was done so

dirty."

.

But they didn't say anything.

.'

.

terrible.

Another elaborated:

wouldn't have bothered any of us near as bad

don't have a job for you anymore,

this

9

And

it

if

they had said, 'Hey,

we don't have your 401fkj, we don't have
And that's what bothers you so bad. It is

takes a long time to get over that. Because

you have

the devastation

of being without employment, you know, just the financial aspects of

you have

it,

no health insurance, but then you have to deal with being treated that way. And that,
for me, has been the hardest part. I'm not over that yet. Because I feel like some-

body

that they

had no respect for whatsoever. And

that has

been very

difficult for

me." 10

Prior to the closing, most workers had felt extremely loyal to Greenbrier.

who worked on maintenance and

Walker,

Bob

security for eighteen years, described his deep

loyalty to the plant manager.

"He was

me. ...

like a father to

always a company person ...

I

I

would have done anything

had opportunities on top of opportunities

He

to take

it

kickbacks on things and

described being injured several years ago, and his decision not to

compensation claim or

"No

I

a car

pay, no workmen's comp, or anything.
would just hurt the company. Then I had

my

back. But

I

company had enough of

many

I

was

grow.
I

I

didn't."

a workers'

file

to ask for sick pay.

it

reinjured

Like

for him, really.

cared about the place and wanted to see

wanted

didn't sue or apply for
that

on 'em, so

other workers, Walker

I

didn't."

was astonished

to

be ...

I felt

at the time that

wreck with one of their vehicles,
workmen's comp or anything. The
11

to learn that the

managers did not

have the same respect for him.

When
mous

asked to explain

in their judgment:

why

the plant closed, the Greenbrier ex-workers

were unani-

bad management. Some blamed the plant and personnel man-

agers; other placed the fault

on upper management and owners

in

New

Jersey.

Some

believed their bosses to have been devious and manipulative; others guessed that they

were merely incompetent and lost money by planning and running the factory poorly.
Every worker believed that the plant was entirely profitable, efficient, and productive,
and that

it

therefore closed unnecessarily.

Most workers personalized

expressed their sense of extreme betrayal by the plant managers

their blame,

who had been

and

like

parents to them.

Although Greenbrier Industries survived entirely on government contracts with government inspectors always overseeing every aspect of its production, the workers did
not blame the government for what happened. All they would ask the government to do
differently is to punish the "thieves"

—

the corporate officials

who

took their savings

and health premiums without providing the promised benefits. None of those interviewed had ever been involved in political campaigns or issues, and many had never
even voted. For them, the plant closure and their elected

officials' inefficacy

forced their sense of powerlessness and their belief that the political system

only reinis ulti-

mately corrupt.

The

fired Greenbrier

workers were more likely to look within the plant

25

itself for

an

New England Journal of Public

explanation.
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Many blamed

their fellow workers.

One

supervisor described the high

turnover rates, which compromised both efficiency and product quality. While she

noted that machine operators whose $8.00 or $9.00 an hour rate for piecework had been
decreased to $4.50 an hour, she did not connect this fact to the high turnover. Instead,

more pride in their work. They're really
young people. I guess they're spoiled, probwith welfare and that kind of help." She also

she blamed the workers: "People don't take any

know

not that ambitious, you

.

.

.

especially

ably. I think a lot of them are satisfied
blamed workers for submitting excessive workers' compensation claims, although acknowledging that work-related injuries were rampant, and she had no examples of
12
Even after the extreme hardship foisted on them by the company, the workers
fraud.
often blamed one another for hurting Greenbrier. Even after being forced to apply for
welfare and food stamps, the workers put down people who drew welfare or relied on
any type of government subsidy, seeing themselves as fundamentally "different." Although they were down on their luck, the Greenbrier workers believed that unlike other
recipients of aid, they were more than willing to work.

Acme Boot Company
Once upon a time, the Acme Boot Company owned
Case

2:

and operated

five large

boot-mak-

employed thousands of workers in sorting, cutting, stamping,
stitching, piping, and shipping and receiving. Making high-quality casual, dress, and
cowboy boots for such famous labels as Dingo, Dan Post, and Luchessi, Acme was the
largest boot manufacturer in the world. Unlike most factories in rural Tennessee, Acme
Boot was unionized, and employees were well treated and relatively well paid. Workers
describe leaving farms or coal mines to work at Acme, then encouraging their families
ing plants in Tennessee.

and friends

and

to join

It

them.

to their pride in the

The company had been
quarters in Clarksville,

Many

in

its

closeness they felt with their fellow workers

Tennessee for nearly seventy years, and

Acme was

ployer. People in Clarksville

pany had sent

attest to the

unsurpassed quality of the product they turned out every day.

still

proud

to

at

corporate head-

be the county's largest and best-known em-

remember how, during

the Great Depression, the

workers out to cut the grass every day rather than lay them

com-

off.

Beginning in the early 1980s, Acme Boot plants began to shrink or close, as the work
was moved elsewhere. Acme had opened nonunion, lower-wage plants in Texas,
Mexico, and South America, and much of the production was done there, with boots
returning to Tennessee for finishing, repairs, and shipping. By 1990, the Clarksville
plant was the only one remaining, and many laid-off workers had relocated there to
keep their boot-making jobs. In November 1992, the final bomb fell. Acme announced
plans to close the Clarksville manufacturing plant. About six hundred people would be
laid off, most within two months, and production work would shift south, especially to
a new plant in Puerto Rico. The company president announced that some management
and supervisory personnel would move to Puerto Rico immediately to begin operations
there. He reassured the community that although no manufacturing operations would
remain in Clarksville, almost a hundred managerial employees would remain in corporate headquarters there.

home," he

said.

13

"Acme

will continue to be in Clarksville

The workers saw

it

.

.

.

Clarksville

is

differently.

The events leading to this closing had begun several years earlier. In 1985 the company had been bought out by Farley Industries, a Chicago-based, privately held firm led
by industrialist and high-profile takeover specialist William F. Farley. A diversified

company with

interests in

automotive components, railroad parts, apparel, and foot-

26

wear, Farley Industries

best

is

known

for

its

Fruit of the

Loom

label. Farley

viewed

Acme's reported annual sales of more than $3 billion as a profitable addition to its footwear holdings. The decision to close the Clarksville plant, made in Farley's offices in
Chicago's Sears Tower, was part of a long-term restructuring toward outsourcing, according to corporate spokespeople. Acme would move out of manufacturing and into
marketing, buying low-cost boots from makers in Latin America and elsewhere and
selling them under the Acme labels.
For the immediate future, however, production was booming in El Paso
much of
the actual work was done, for much lower wages, across the border in Mexico, where
the two Acme plants had doubled their employee base and tripled production in the
14
previous year.
The Clarksville boot-making operations were being moved to Puerto
Rico. Asked to explain this decision, Acme president Mike Vogel said, "It's better for us
There are some tax code advantages to doing work in
to do it there. It's less costly
Rico."
Puerto
He also cited lower wage and benefit costs and potential employee training incentives for Acme. He did not say that the Clarksville plant was closing because it
was doing badly. Indeed, 1992 was Acme Boot's second best profit-making year of all

—

.

time.

.

.
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The decision

to

move

the plant to Puerto Rico

was

directly

encouraged by both the

Puerto Rican and the U.S. governments. After discussions, Puerto Rican officials gave

Acme Boot

Toa Alta owned by the Puerto Rico Industrial Development
The building and its surrounding roads and utilities had
been built with federal government money, and had previously been occupied by a pharmaceutical division of Baxter International Inc. Acme, in return, had promised to invest
$1 million in production equipment and machinery and to hire six hundred workers. The
newspaper Caribbean Business reported, "The establishment of Acme Boot operations
in Puerto Rico is a major boost to the island's footwear and leather goods industry, especially in light of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which is seen as influencing labor-intensive industries such as apparel and leather goods to set up plants in
a building in

Company, a government

entity.

Mexico." 16
This great boon for economic developers in Puerto Rico was an equally great tragedy

The Acme jobs were not extremely well paid, and the work
was certainly not easy. The highest pay bracket for unionized workers, $7.95 an hour,
was only for those who had been on the job more than thirty years. When the plant
closed, the average employee was forty-eight years old and the average length of seniority was twenty-five years. Most workers had believed their jobs were absolutely secure.
Having worked at Acme for their entire adult lives, they had no experience or training in
anything else. Moreover, Clarksville was in the middle of a serious recession
according to most workers a true depression
and they knew other jobs would be scarce and
pay well below Acme's rates. Jobs above minimum wage were nearly impossible to
for the Clarksville workers.

—

—

find.

The Union Fights Back
For about ten years previous to
union

manded

cuts in

wage

Boot's closing, management had been telling the

scales and concessions

chief steward at the time,
early 1980s.
I

Acme

— United Rubber Workers Local 330 (URW) —

tried at that

"We went

remembers one

on

that times

benefits.

were tough and de-

Alan Buckner, Local 330's

particularly harsh round of negotiations in the

through negotiations to give concessions to keep the plants open.

time to get [the union president] not to do

27

it. I

said, 'They're

going to
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close the plants anyways.' But cuts and concessions came.

I

went from piecework

to

went from $13.22 an hour to $5.35." 17 With every contract, more pay
cuts were handed down and more hard-won benefits were lost. Managers brought in
cost figures from El Paso and elsewhere and told the employees that to retain the work
hourly work.

I

had to be "competitive" and cut their own costs. The workers voted
go along with the concessions in the hope of saving the factory and their jobs.
When the company announced that the Clarksville plant would close, the union
leadership was surprised and furious. They had seen Acme's other Tennessee plants
Acme Boot's first and
close, and had been reassured that the Clarksville factory
was doing better than ever. Suddenly they were told that within two
flagship plant
months from the announcement, half the employees would be laid off. Even worse,
in Clarksville they

to

—

—

managers were already being relocated
brand-new

Acme

to Puerto

Rico to hire 250 workers for the

Footwear, Inc.

The union immediately challenged

the legality of the shutdown, claiming that

Acme

Boot officials had violated the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act by not telling the employees who would be laid off when. Federal law requires
companies to give employees sixty days' advance notice of potential layoffs or plant
closings. The Tennessee Department of Labor was given a list of those who were to be
separated in the coming two weeks, but the workers were never advised.

The union then began a

Acme

publicity campaign, notifying the local press and local offi-

The union held a very well-attended rally, claiming that
was possibly illegal and certainly immoral. Individual
workers told their stories and wondered what they would do after losing one of the best
jobs in Clarksville. Forced to respond, company officials assured the public that they
intended to be a "good corporate citizen" of Clarksville, providing more assistance and
notification on the closing than required by law. Focusing on the hundred remaining
employees, Vogel claimed, "The last five or six years have been very tough. What we
are trying to do is make this company well so we have jobs for the remaining employ18
The workers, who had received their highest production bonuses ever, knew
ees."
differently. The Clarksville plant's profits were higher than they'd ever been.
Union leadership, who began to research Acme's proposed move to Puerto Rico,
found that the company was taking advantage of the Possessions Tax Credit, also known
as Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which allows Puerto Rico subsidiaries to repatriate their profits back to their American corporate parents without federal
taxation. Federal corporate income taxes are waived on profits earned in U.S. territories,
including Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, giving multinational corporations
cials

of

Boot's plans.

closing the Clarksville plant

a legal 100 percent tax break. Also, under the Puerto Rico Tax Incentive Act, an Ameri-

can company

is not required to pay the high Puerto Rico income taxes. The company
acknowledged that it was looking forward to the tax breaks.
With the help of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union

(OCAW), which had just been through
Whitehall Pharmaceuticals, the
fight

Acme's

The

plans.

can refuse

to

about Section 936 and decided to
was to block the company from taking advantage of
relying on a 1987 commonwealth law which said that local

strategy

Puerto Rico's tax breaks,
officials

waive the local corporate taxes

move caused economic

hardships on the mainland.

tions asks if the jobs in Puerto
is

yes, the

company

is

a similar fight against the Elkhart, Indiana,

URW learned more

A

Rico would cost jobs

ineligible for tax benefits.
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if

they find that a company's

question on the tax break applica-

in the

United States.

Acme's answer,

no,

If the

was a

lie,

answer
which

constitutes tax fraud.

Acme's move to Puerto Rico.
blamed
URW
directly
Section 936 for Clarksville's
runaway
shop,
the
Calling
a
The
United
Rubber
Workers vowed to save Acme
of
480
in
one
year.
expected loss
jobs
or
the
Puerto
Rican
government
to review and deny
Boot by convincing either the U.S.
never
been
taken.
union
The
amassed proof
the company's claims, an action that had
that equipment was shipped directly from Clarksville to Puerto Rico and that the work
planned for Puerto Rico duplicated part of the Clarksville operation. The union found
support from other organizations, such as the Midwest Center for Labor Research
(MCLR), which identified thirty-five communities from which more than 15,000 jobs
were transferred from mainland plants to Puerto Rico tax-sheltered factories
these
represented only a fraction of the 100,000 people known to be employed in Puerto
Rican factories owned by American corporations. A researcher with the MCLR called
this "a case of tax-loophole-driven job destruction" and agreed with the URW's position
against Acme's petition.
Union leaders traveled to Washington to try to convince the American government to
block Acme Boot's 936 request. There they found themselves up against the Puerto
Rico-USA Foundation, a lobbying group made up of seventy major Fortune 500 corporations fighting to uphold Section 936 and other incentives. Initiatives by members of
Congress to amend 936, or to require corifirmation that job transfers do not harm mainland workers, have repeatedly failed. The congressmen cannot compete with aggressive
lobbyists for companies like Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, which saves $156,400 in taxes for
every employee in Puerto Rico, whose earnings average only $26,471. The U.S. Treasury Department estimates that it annually loses about $3 billion in taxes to Section 936
In January the union held a second rally, focusing on

Acme

—

—

profits that accrue directly to transnational corporations.

Union leaders

19

also initiated contacts with Puerto Rican officials, urging that they

enforce their law prohibiting tax benefits to manufacturing companies whose relocation

on the island is directly responsible for job losses in the States. They found that Acme
had already been received with open arms by local politicians desperate for new jobs at
almost any price.

URW president Mitch Tucker wrote to Puerto Rico governor Pedro

Rossello to ask that he deny tax benefits to

Acme

Boot.

He

said that the plant scheduled

open in Toa Alta, Puerto Rico, would be carrying out essentially the same manufacturing procedures being performed in Clarksville. "We state to you unequivocally that
to

this is

a runaway shop ... If an exemption has already been granted, you must revoke

... If an application

is

now

pending,

it

should be denied." Tucker added that

"plans to perform Clarksville production processes on Clarksville brand

with equipment shipped from Clarksville

.

.

represent the facts otherwise, especially on
Incentive Act,

Carlos

would be

.

Any

its

attempt by

Acme

it

Acme

name boots

Footwear,

Inc., to

application under the Puerto Rico Tax

fraudulent." 20 Tucker also sent letters to resident commissioner

Romero Barcelo and

to vice president-elect Albert Gore, neither of

whom

re-

plied.

Thwarted
campaign.

in

Its

its

efforts within regular political channels, the

URW launched a public

goal was to increase public pressure to persuade the

manufacturing operations in Clarksville and to abandon

its

company

ing plant in Puerto Rico. At a rally in Clarksville, Mitch Tucker vowed,

send William Farley a message.

We

on Farley

made

to fulfill his promise,

to continue

plans to open a boot finish-

"We want

to

intend to fight this illegal shutdown." Turner called
at the

time of purchase, that

Acme Boot would

maintain manufacturing in Clarksville. 21 The rally featured Connie Malloy of the
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OCAW, who

of Public Policy

had helped

936

fight Section

The

Decaturville Sportswear worker.

in Elkhart,

URW repeatedly

and Ricky Mullins, a dislocated
drew on the parallels between the

Clarksville and Decaturville stories, as the Decaturville plant closing

had been a major

1992 when the company moved from Tennessee to Central America
with the support of the Agency for International Development. Vice President Gore had
visited Decaturville and denounced the pattern it represented, and Ricky Mullins had

campaign issue

in

to the Faces of

been invited

Hope luncheon

at the

Clinton inaugural. Yet

when

pointed out the similarity and asked for the Clinton administration's support,

no

it

the

URW

received

reply.

The union urged
its rallies,

all

community groups and churches to attend
its campaign. The media,
take notice. The San Juan Star quoted Puerto Rico's

area unions as well as

demonstrations, and events and to participate in

and some public

new

chief of

away), then

officials, began to
economic development, Clifford Myatt:

we

will

be obliged

Myatt also cautioned

that

to

make

a clear case (of a run-

at the

Acme appli"We

between runaways and normal plant closings.

will have to see the reasons for the closing,
if it

it is

while his agency would take a close look

cation, there is "a very thin fine"

ness sense, and

"If

a decision in accordance with the facts." But

whether the company thinks

does not relocate in Puerto Rico,

if it

it

makes busisomewhere

intends to relocate

And a spokeswoman for vice president-elect Al Gore said Acme's proposed move
was "an unfortunate use of the existing tax law, which was intended to create jobs." 22
With other groups from Clarksville and elsewhere in Tennessee and the nation, the
Acme workers planned event after event. They held demonstrations, press conferences,
and marches. Supported by the Clarksville community, they held a three-hundred-car
motorcade through the small downtown. Every weekend, workers stood in front of
K-Mart and Winn-Dixie, distributing flyers that explained Section 936 and their plight
and encouraging community members to contact all relevant decision makers. In April
the union sponsored a mass public boot-burning, at which hundreds of Clarksville resielse."

dents burned their

boycott of

Acme

Acme-made

boots. This dramatic gesture inaugurated a national

Acme, Dingo, and Dan Post

boots.

A boycott

"The Anatomy of an
Mike Konopaki, was distrib-

flier,

Boot," designed by award-winning labor cartoonist

uted by labor unions nationwide.

On May

29, 1993, the Walter Cronkite

Clarksville plant. Invited

by the

URW,

other events, including the last day of

Report covered the shutdown of the

the Report staff attended the boot-burning and

work

at

Acme Boot on May

21.

The Cronkite

Report aired extensive footage of interviews with dislocated employees and showed the

on workers in the already depressed Clarksville economy.
emphasized job flight, the lure of Section 936, and the connection between tax policy
and job loss. Following the Cronkite Report, other national and local news media

devastating impact of job loss
It

Acme Boot story. Members of Local 330, who received mail and support
from individuals and groups around the country, were tremendously encouraged by the

picked up the

outpouring of public support for their cause.

At the end of May, Acme suddenly announced that it would not seek federal income
on profits from the Puerto Rico plant. The company withdrew its application for Section 936 benefits. Acme president MikeVogel explained that although the
company was distancing itself from the 936 issue, it would still receive local incentives
and was still moving. He claimed that the Clarksville plant closing and the establishment of a new plant in Puerto Rico were "nonrelated, coincidental issues." 23 A high-

tax exemptions

ranking Puerto Rican official cited "corporate exhaustion" as the reason for Acme's

30

withdrawal of

tax exemption application.

its

has been so vociferous and unfair

more bad

P.R. Also, they've

they decided to forget

it."

And

in its attack

Clifford Myatt said, "I think the union

on them that [Acme doesn't] want any

been inundated with so much paperwork and expenses

that

24

This was a major victory for the workers' campaign against

Acme. Yet they had

not

succeeded in saving their jobs or their community. The Clarksville plant closed on
schedule, and the company, without benefit of tax breaks,

Puerto Rico. After months

moved

its

operations to

of mobilization, coalition building, public education,

attention, political lobbying,

and

protest, the Clarksville

community

lost

Acme

media
Boot.

Lessons from the United Rubber Workers Fight

The most obvious and significant difference between the situations at Greenbrier and
Acme Boot was the presence of a strong union. First, because the URW was regularly
negotiating contracts with the company,

it

had access

to financial reports

and other

information and could see the coming changes before anything drastic happened. Second, because the union had an organizing structure in place, workers could be informed

almost immediately as events unfolded. They were therefore less likely to blame one
another and were kept up to date on the situation. Third, the union had connections to
larger organizations, especially to the
coalitions like Tennessee Industrial
tutes like the
ers'

MCLR.

URW International

It,

rallies,

insti-

All these provided crucial support at various stages of the work-

mobilization and lobbying. Fourth, the union

paign.

Union, other labor unions,

Renewal Network, and research and advocacy

knew how

to launch a public

cam-

and other unions, unlike the Greenbrier workers, had held marches, parades,

boycotts, and other events previously and

knew how

to organize actions success-

Union leaders and members had been
active in political campaigns, so they knew which officials to call first. Finally, the
URW had access to resources from outside the Clarksville community. They could pay
people to fly in for rallies; send representatives to Washington to lobby; create leaflets,
posters, and banners; and buy advertising space in local newspapers. By contrast, the
Greenbrier workers could not even communicate with the bankruptcy trustee because
they could not afford a long-distance phone call to New Jersey.
Interestingly, despite all these benefits Acme's workers were not more pro-union
than Greenbrier's. A few blamed the union for giving away too much or for not doing
more to prevent the closure, but most were absolutely indifferent on the subject of
unions. Although they were not ideologically committed to unions, they appreciated the
benefits and work environment created by a union. Sally Kellam was typical; referring
to her search for a new job, she said, "I don't care one way or the other; it don't matter
fully.

to

me

They had

if it's

dealt with the press regularly.

union or non-union."

tween the two types of

plants,

that things are just different [at

new job involved

layoffs,

On

the other hand, she noticed real differences be-

and she did have a preference.
nonunion

plants]."

Her most

"I just don't like the

way

serious complaints at her

which were random or involved favoritism, mandatory overWith the union at Acme Boot, workers had

time, and unequal treatment of workers. 25

come

to expect fair treatment,

open and agreed-upon procedures, and reliable avenues
seems to have fu-

for redress of grievances. This general expectation of fair treatment

eled the campaign against Section 936 as well.

Although the

Acme Boot campaign

failed in

its

immediate goal,

it

had a

striking

impact on both participants and other members of the community. Ironically, while
unions are usually charged with creating antagonism between workers and management,
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just the opposite

can be demonstrated here. Unlike the Greenbrier workers, no

Boot employees blamed

Acme

managers. Instead, they blamed the federal

their supervisors or

government for maintaining the Section 936 tax loophole and helping major corporaThe workforce was effectively educated to

tions rather than workers of either country.

understand the national and international political decisions that led to the plant closing.

They understood Acme's move

as a strategic decision

encouraged by a

series of

governmental decisions made under pressure from large transnational corporations.

When

other economic issues arose, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement,

they could understand them in this

who had

same

opinions said they believed

Acme Boot

While most of the Greenbrier workers
would probably be "a good thing," all the

context.

NAFTA

workers interviewed could speak quite knowledgeably about the agreement

on both American and Mexican workers.
The Acme personnel were better educated about American politics as well. They had
participated in letter-writing campaigns, met with politicians, and learned a great deal
about the political process. They were not, however, necessarily more sanguine about
the political system. Sally Kellam expressed a common sentiment: "We [the URW
workers] went out here and worked for [President Clinton] to get him in office. Now we
feel like we've been let down. So, I don't think I'm gonna vote again. What's the point?
Now, maybe I'll change when the time comes again."
But whether or not she participates in electoral politics, Kellam was changed by the
Acme Boot campaign: "I've gotten more involved in a lot of things since this plant
closing
I've gotten more involved. I have never in my life wrote letters to congressmen and the White House; I never was like this
But I feel like we need to stand up
because that's important. They need to know how the people feel. It could make a
and

.

.

effects

its

.

.

.

.

.

change.

Case

It

could

make

.

.

a difference." 26

General Electric

3:

In Morristown, a midsize

town

in the

mountainous, rural Appalachian region, a job

at

General Electric had been considered one of the best positions a person could hold.

Morristown has a low

rate

of unionization and, like

Hamblen County has been hard

all

of upper East Tennessee,

GE

was conwage
scales higher than those of most local industrial facilities. Most workers earned between
$9.00 and $12.00 an hour, had been there for many years, and considered that they had
secure, permanent jobs. Yet a new management team had begun to institute changes that
seemed to alter the character of the plant and labor-management relations for the worse.
The workers felt increasingly harassed and powerless.
hit

by plant closings and

layoffs. In 1988,

sidered a progressive employer and an invaluable asset to the community, with

Workers (IBEW)
GE's Morristown plant. There was great initial support among workers, but the company spared no expense to counter the union
campaign. Management treated employees to parties and gifts. Workers were shown
films describing how the union would hurt them and the plant. The company produced
In June of that year, the International Brotherhood of Electrical

launched a union organizing campaign

its

own

videocassette devoted to "the

at

GE

family," complete with shots of nearly every

some with families and friends, and the beautiful surrounding area. For
the company commissioned an original country music song dedicated to

worker,

the

video,

the

people and countryside of Morristown.

and

their

It

promised that

community more than any "outside" union
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GE

could.

would

protect

its

workers

By September of 1988, by instilling a mixture of fear and complacency, the company
won the struggle, and the union was voted down by a 3-to- margin. One observer

had

1

noted that "the employees

beamed with

company how they
One week after the vote, GE

strate to the

pride because they thought this

would demon-

believed in General Electric." 27

laid off more than one hundred of those same workers.
They were told that they would be recalled to work in the spring of 1989. But the next
week they learned from radio, television, and newspapers that their jobs were permanently lost. The distribution center warehouse was moving thirty miles away, literally
down the road, to the town of Mascot in adjacent Knox County. GE had received economic development incentives from Knox County to encourage the move, as well as
state funding to train new workers. At the new site, GE announced, all work would be

subcontracted through

USCO,

an independent company, and

all

jobs would be rede-

fined as "temporary," even though the work was no different than

it

had been. The pay

would be about $6.00 an hour, with no benefits, a far cry from the union wages the
workers had once anticipated.

Knox County

executive Dwight Kessell

county's director of economic development for "the extraordinary
curing this

new

industry and these

After hearing about the
ers to see if there

was any

new

new jobs

They met

The company

in order to

do

By

their

own jobs,

for half the

keep

their jobs, ben-

to initiate negotiations to retain their jobs,

remain competitive in the
up on changing manage-

stated that, in order to

ment's mind, some workers simply traveled to the
to

manag-

as a group to discuss possible courses

global market, tough measures were necessary. After giving

—

the

in se-

County." 28

own wages

and seniority were refused. Attempting

they were again refused.

Knox

work she did

plans, the laid-off workers attempted to contact

alternative.

of action. Their offers to freeze or cut their
efits,

for

commended

pay and no

USCO

benefits.

plant, asking to

be hired there

They were never called back.
workers were looking for new

end of 1989, the hundred permanently laid-off
Tennessee Department of Employment Security Job
Service comprised very few openings, and hardly any above minimum wage. Officials
referred worker after worker to temporary service and contract-labor agencies. Unlike
traditional employers, these agencies were continually hiring. Morristown-area factories were increasingly choosing to contract out for "temporary" employees rather than
hire their own permanent workers.

jobs.

the

The

official listings at the

The Birth of CATS
Having lost good jobs
rary service

was

at

General Electric, the workers were shocked to hear that tempo-

their only option.

Many had

to support families

jobs with absolutely no security or stability, at such low pay and

and could not rely on

—

most important for
They were shocked, too, to find
that they were not alone; permanent, decent-paying jobs in Morristown were systematically being replaced by temporary jobs, either through agencies or through in-house
temporary labor pools at large companies. The outraged workers, mostly women, began
to meet regularly. At one meeting, someone
no one can now remember exactly who
suggested they call their group Citizens Against Temporary Services, or CATS, and

some

— with no

health insurance or pension benefits.

—

—

the

name stuck.
One of their plans was

to hire

an attorney

who would

file

a lawsuit against

GE.

Charging age discrimination, since older workers had been disproportionately singled
out for layoffs, and fraudulent use of government funds, they compiled evidence for a

case against

GE. Although they believed

their case
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was

strong, the initial hearings

New England Journal of Public

dragged on, and

it

Policy

became apparent

that, if

they could win at

all,

would
manage-

the legal route

not further their goals in a timely fashion. Eventually, under pressure from

GE

ment, their lawyer withdrew from the case and they were forced to drop the

suit

without

winning anything.
Initially optimistic that aid

would be forthcoming once the

facts of their case

were

began to contact politicians and community leaders to see if anything could
be done. When they met with only apathy or outright hostility from officials, CATS
decided to plan community meetings to put pressure on GE but also to expose their
public, they

larger concerns about the increasing use and abuse of temporary

by

large companies.

CATS

set out to generate support

and contingent workers

and to exert pressure

to get their

jobs back, but also to look for ways to address issues of injustice in the workplace that

were affecting workers

With a

little

in

research,

Hamblen County.

CATS

leaders quickly discovered that the loss of permanent

jobs to the instability and inequities of temporary jobs was a national trend. In fact, the

growth of part-time, seasonal, and other forms of contingent work represents a sea

change in the American workplace. In 1989 the National Planning Association

esti-

mated that nearly one third of the entire workforce was composed of contingent workers, and that the percentage was growing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, women and minorities
are disproportionately represented in the temporary workforce

— nearly double

29

their

Between 1983 and 1993, the number of temporary
workers increased by more than 300 percent. 30 The payroll of temporary employment
services
increased by almost 3000 percent
one part of the contingent work boom
between 1970 and 1992. 31 By 1994, Manpower, Inc.
a temporary help supply service
was the largest employer in the United States, with nearly one million employees.
As CATS began to seek help elsewhere and to devise plans, they found many local
groups and individuals who had similar concerns. They talked with unionized and unorganized workers, and with community groups, politicians, and unemployed people.
Workers from all industries were aware of the problem and troubled by the trend toward
contingent work. On the one hand there was a broad concern and support for reform; on
the other hand, there was very little precedent for positive change. CATS found that
because temporary service agencies in Tennessee were completely unregulated, there
was no official route through which to address abuses. At a legislative meeting in late
1989, the administrator of Tennessee's Personnel Recruiting Service Board, which licenses permanent employment placement agencies, said she receives about ten complaints per year about permanent employment agencies, but she gets three complaints
per week about temporary agencies, over which she has no jurisdiction.
After organizing in the fall of 1989, CATS proved extremely persistent and determined. Wearing their self-made, bright red T-shirts emblazoned CITIZENS AGAINST
TEMPORARY SERVICES across the back, they were highly visible around town. One
of their initial events was a community meeting in Morristown to publicize their plight
and the issue of temporary jobs. Nearly four hundred people attended
a record for
the small town. Shortly thereafter, CATS marched down the streets of Morristown calling for fair labor laws in Tennessee. Hundreds of people attended the parade, which was
spirited yet serious in its demands for attention and reform.
These events, and the remarkable turnout they generated, were all the more impressive because the only Morristown newspaper refused to carry any stories about CATS.
The city and county governments, the Chamber of Commerce, the local business community, and the local media either actively opposed CATS
as antagonistic to corpopercentages in the total workforce.

—

—
—

—

—

—
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rate interests

missed

and therefore harmful

find other strategies to publicize

members and

its

— or

Hamblen County's "business climate"

message and

events.

One way

CATS

free advertising

weekly

meetings and other

involved organizing

that

activities,

even publishing short

made

it

articles.

This proved most effective,

a useful conduit of information.

CATS's public events did not draw mainstream media, they did serve another

cial function: attracting the attention of important potential allies.

palachia

parade was Bill Troy, a

(CORA), a

Troy was

and

was to buy space in the Smoky Mountain Trader, a small,
was available all over town. In it, CATS publicized its

as the Trader's wide circulation

at the April

dis-

had to

their families to distribute leaflets advertising events at supermarkets

other public places. Another

If

to

as irrelevant. After being blacked out by the town's one paper,

it

staff

member

coalition of church groups

in the process of

One

cru-

of the marchers

of the Committee on Religion in Ap-

working on issues of economic

justice.

founding a new organization, the Tennessee Industrial Re-

newal Network (TIRN), a coalition of

labor, community, and environmental groups to
Having learned about the CATS march through
friends at the Highlander Center for Research and Education, another Appalachian
institution interested in economic justice, Troy was inspired by CATS members. He
immediately got in touch with the group and remained involved for the next five years.
He invited CATS representatives to a June 1990 Chattanooga conference he was orga-

work on economic

issues statewide.

CATS members

nizing for June 1990, "Responding to Plant Closings in Tennessee."

attended the conference, speaking movingly about their experiences with the

house closing and

which

set

its

aftermath. This

up an ongoing committee

was the beginning of a close

to assist

CATS

efforts

GE

alliance with

ware-

TIRN,

with staff support and other

resources.

Through

their contacts with

Highlander Center

staff,

CATS became

aware of an

Appalachian citizens group, Save Our Cumberland Mountains (SOCM).
primarily on environmental and land use problems for

many

years, but

It

had worked

had recently

become more involved with economic and job issues as well. In 1990, CATS voted
become the Morristown chapter of SOCM, thereby taking advantage of the group's

to

extensive experience in organizing, strategizing, and lobbying skills and resources. This
alliance was a further means of institutionalizing CATS and ensuring a strong base from
which it could continue its work.
With the help of SOCM staff, CATS began to design a strategy to push for government action. Ferreting out the facts of the government's complicity in GE's move

proved

difficult.

and Washington,
eral times to

CATS

leaders

made hundreds

of frustrating phone calls to Nashville

to every imaginable relevant office.

A

few traveled

to Nashville sev-

ask questions in person. After nine months of research, they finally discov-

ered that tax dollars had indeed been allocated to

GE to

support

its

move

to

Mascot.

They tracked down the contract showing that GE had been promised $200,000 in Job
Training Partnership Act (JTRA) funds to train new workers for the exact jobs from
which they had been fired. CATS argued that this was illegal, because JTPA funds cannot be used for jobs from which fully capable workers had been laid off. GE argued that
it was legal because the new factory was operated by USCO, the labor contractor, rather
than by GE. After putting pressure on Knox County officials and state and federal labor
department officials, CATS won. It was able to prove that GE was directly responsible
for the warehouse and that the fully capable Morristown workers had not been offered
the new jobs although many would have been willing to take them. CATS finally
persuaded the Department of Labor to declare the GE/USCO warehouse in Mascot
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JTPA funding and withdraw

CATS

Toward the end of 1989,
committee to look

committee on
then

at

the $200,000.

to

push

their state legislators to set

the issue of temporary services.

that they hold hearings in

scheduled for October

They

up a study

also lobbied for a study

laws in Tennessee. Both committees were set up, and

fair labor

demanded

began

at

Community

Walter State

CATS

Morristown. Finally a joint hearing was
College.

CATS

once again

distrib-

uted leaflets, wrote articles for the Trader, activated their telephone tree, and contacted
labor unions,

community groups, churches, and anyone

efforts paid off, as
legislators.

Many

testified

movingly about the experiences they had undergone and

worries for the future of their families
place.

else they could think of. Their

an unexpected seven hundred people showed up to overwhelm the

CATS members were

and children with

surprised and heartened

all

their

the changes in the work-

by the outpouring of support for

over East Tennessee. They heard horrible stories similar

them and their issues from
from friends and allies they never knew they had. Everyone seemed to agree
that the situation for factory workers was dire and becoming worse, and that it was the
government's responsibility to take action. The committee listened dutifully, but, as
usual with study committees, no results materialized.
CATS finally decided that if Tennessee were to have any type of fair labor laws, the
members themselves would have to create them. In 1990 they wrote legislation that
would define temporary employees as temporary, regulate temporary agencies, and
forbid the replacement of permanent workers with temporary ones. This was precedentsetting legislation, since at that time no state or local legislation dealt with the abuse of
temporary services. With help from TIRN and SOCM, CATS members pressed for their
bill to be introduced in the 1990 legislative session. As the date for the vote approached,
all

to theirs

they organized a delegation of about fifty citizens to drive four hours to Nashville to

lobby for themselves. Although

CATS

had done extensive lobbying ahead of time, when

they arrived in Nashville for the vote, they found themselves outnumbered and over-

powered by opponents. Federal Express, Eastman Kodak, and other major Tennessee
employers were pushing hard against the CATS bill. The National Association of Temporary Services and

CATS

its

Tennessee

affiliate

were also lobbying against

it.

Although

had received promises of support from a majority of committee members, several

made

The following
which they again
lobbied extensively. They believed they had a good chance of winning, but they were
outmaneuvered by more politically powerful opponents. After two years of legislative
work, their only tangible result was a bill requiring temporary service agencies to register with the state, a minimal requirement that contained no provisions for regulation or

decided not to vote
year

CATS

at all,

and the

bill

never

it

out of committee.

presented a more streamlined, less ambitious

bill,

for

enforcement.

CATS's Ongoing Legacy

CATS

failed to accomplish

GE jobs

in

Morristown;

it

any of

its

original goals.

It

did not succeed in keeping the

did not get even one worker rehired. After investing consider-

able sums in attorneys' fees, CATS members lost their lawsuit against General Electric.
The time and energy spent lobbying elected representatives did not generate even a

minimal

bill to protect temporary workers. The temporary service industry is subject to
no more regulation than previously, and temporary jobs are still multiplying in
Morristown as permanent ones disappear. Yet despite these failures, CATS is an excellent example of a successful organizing effort. Members of CATS were involved in a
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sustained effort at social change around economic issues. Both the individual partici-

community

pants and the larger Morristown
see

— were transformed by

— arguably even

the entire state of Tennes-

women

the struggles begun by a small group of

laid off

from GE.

CATS

scored several points that cause

it

to stand out

among community

mobiliza-

tions around economic issues. One is symbolized by the name of the group. Unlike the
two companies described above, the Morristown laid-off workers did not organize simply around the events at GE. They did not call themselves the GE Workers Committee,
or Morristown Citizens Against GE. From the outset they were Citizens Against Tempo-

rary Services, representing a conscious decision to focus
rather than

its

symptom. Moreover, because of

its

on the cause of

their

problem

close alliance with larger organiza-

and because of the region's rich history of community organiz-

tions in East Tennessee,

CATS was

immediately encouraged to foster an understanding of its
members' experiences within a wider context. This association with similar yet diverse
groups had many consequences.
First and probably most important was the contribution of organizing expertise. Bill
Troy of CORA and Susan Williams of the Highlander Center worked closely with the
ing struggles,

CATS

group, helping them strategize, build a local coalition, plan events, and carry out

an entire campaign. The

CATS

activists credit

Troy and Williams with inspiring them,

helping them think through their ideas, planning next steps after disappointments, and

keeping them going when they
a

lifeline,

felt like

giving up.

The chairperson of CATS

Second, other organizations provided people to participate in
publicize their issues and struggles.

TIRN

them

calls

saying that she would not have survived without their aid.

CATS members

CATS

events and to

spoke to a national audience

founding conference in Chattanooga and to statewide audiences

at the

at rallies in

TIRN leaders to speak with other displaced workJTPA and other programs, but also about the changes that
the needs of working people. Some even attended a confer-

Knoxville and Memphis. They joined
ers about practical issues like

are required to better serve

ence in Washington, D.C., about

women

in the

changing workplace.

Third, other organizations provided essential training in leadership skills.

members

participated in

and organizers from

were handled

all

workshops

at the

over the South and Appalachia, learning

in similar communities.

They were encouraged

suade others to get involved, to confront decision makers,

women involved.
Fourth, CATS members were exposed

CATS

Highlander Center with community

to

how

activists

similar struggles

speak publicly, to per-

all entirely

new

experiences

for the

own. The most dramatic example was a
Mexico, sponsored by TIRN.
eight other

women

to

communities extremely different from

trip to the

Two CATS

maquiladora

(free trade)

leaders participated in the

trip,

their

zone in

along with

workers from East Tennessee. They visited a General Electric plant,

among others, and were horrified by the living and working conditions provided by
American corporations. They learned to make connections between their own experiences and those of Mexican women working in the maquiladoras for very low wages,
with no job security or organizing rights. Simply by traveling around Tennessee and
meeting with other groups in the context of their fight for
bers were educated about changes in the

economy and

fair labor laws,

their effects

on

all

CATS memkinds of

groups.
Finally, even

underwent a

more

intensely than the

political education

Acme Boot

workers, the

CATS

participants

and transformation. Until 1988 they had been very
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some of

lucky, holding

most secure, and highest-paying jobs

the best,

in

Hamblen

County. Through a sudden management decision they became not just laid-off factory

workers but, even worse, workers qualified only for the most unstable, poorest-paying
temporary service positions. This changed their view not only of themselves but of
others as well. Kathy Muller, a CATS leader, described the changes she saw in herself:
must have been a shallow person. Because, see, I was in my own world. I got up
when I went to the
I went to work, and I made good money, and
grocery store and I saw somebody that had food stamps, I always thought, "Oh, that
I

every day, and

kind of people, they ought to get a job and go to work

little

that

.

I'm able

to look

having a hard time.

I

.

."

.

Now

I'm grateful

and see and have compassion for people, because they're
wrote Al Gore a

I

percent of our society would work,

can survive ...

.

.

really think if

if

letter

and told him that

they could

make

I

fully believe that

a decent

you give people the incentive

wage

98

where they

to

that they'll

work. 32

In addition to their attitudes, their political behavior changed as they organized

CATS. Not one member had

ever been to the state capitol in Nashville, and very few

had ever so much as written a

worked

GE

at

I

Now

challenged them on anything.
take their

word

for nothing ...

change for Muller.

Even when

I

lost

and then when
this.

letter to

would've never asked

"I

had

my job,

all
I

I

I

official.

As Muller

government a question.

said,
I

challenge them on everything.

"When

I

would've never
I

mean,

I

wouldn't

can see beyond what they say." This was a major

was

Labor Department.
go out and find another job,
in I thought, Well, our government won't let GE do
let 'em do it, they're doing it every day, then I

these ideas that there

thought, Well, not to worry,

reality started setting

And when you

a public

my

realize they will

justice in the
I'll

33
to ask questions."

began

The process of beginning to ask questions and doubting long-held beliefs about auwas extremely difficult for many. Joe Perkinson, a veteran of the Korean and
Vietnam wars, who was fifty years old when he was laid off, seriously contemplated
suicide and other types of violence. He threatened to bring in a gun to force GE managers to give him his job back, at whatever wage. Others in the group convinced him to
use more peaceful means. He now has a minimum-wage, temporary job as a security

thority

at the Morristown mall. He says he understands why the crime rate is so high in
where there are no good jobs. 34 Kathy Muller points out that none of the CATS
members had ever fought for something like this before. "I was the type of person, I

guard
areas

guess that
cause
if

if

[GE] had told

thought they

I

me

to

go out

knew what was

in a lake

best for

me

and jump

...

I

in, I

would've went

had been brought up

you got a job you did the very best you could, you worked as hard

did what they said, because they were boss, and you'd be okay!
didn't work,

it

was

hard,

it

was

as

When

I

in,

be-

to think that

you could, you
realized that

really hard." 35

These hard-learned lessons stuck. More than anyone in Greenbrier or Acme Boot, the
members of CATS continued to participate in political activities. CATS became the
Hamblen County chapter of SOCM, and Muller became a leader in a new campaign to
get city drinking water for people living in a neighborhood near a polluted landfill.

who were previously virulently antiunion, led and
union campaigns. All the members interviewed were extremely knowledge-

Other members, including several

worked

in

able about
issues.

NAFTA,

welfare reform, labor law reform, and other national economic

They continued

to write letters

Most important, they have learned

and meet with

to stand

legislators at every opportunity.

up for themselves, both individually and
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collectively.

when

Each one can

injustice

tell

stories of confronting authorities, at

was being done. These small demonstrations of

have had an impact on many

gether,

CATS

lives.

also transformed Morristown.

CATS

workplace knows to contact a

work and elsewhere,

resistance, taken to-

Anyone

leader.

A

in that

town who has a problem

small group of them

now

in the

serve as infor-

mal job counselors for nearly the entire city's population. Moreover, although it has
SOCM and has quieted down during the past four years, public officials in

become

Morristown remember CATS. The county executive and Chamber of Commerce
cials refer to

it

as having instituted the strongest protest about jobs

Hamblen County has ever

seen.

Although

CATS may

legacy can be detected in the ongoing decisions

known

the group's organized

power and

have

made by

will always,

lost the

offi-

and the economy
immediate

local officials

battle, its

who have

even unconsciously, anticipate

their reactions.

*

The most
Tennessee

in East

*

striking conclusion to
is

*

be drawn from the three cases of mobilization

the exceptional potential of ordinary working people to take on a

complicated issue, educate themselves, fight for what they deserve, and join with others
in a

common

struggle.

The

enormous resources

place,

crucial corollary is that in order for this process to take

are necessary. This is true not in the sense of a traditional

"resource mobilization" 36 framework, but in terms of indigenous resources from within

a community: an institutionalized base with which groups can
nizing

skills,

affiliate

These three examples show

that

abundant crises in every community can serve as

sources of mobilization and protest, but their consequences are

more

three companies, the consequence the participants sought

to

In

all

and learn orga-

sources of publicity and information, and leadership.

—

difficult to predict.

keep

their jobs

—

eluded them. The global economy brings a widening gap in power that has proved to be
too severe for impoverished local groups to overcome. Only few such campaigns will

ever produce concrete improvements in economic circumstances, by keeping a plant

from moving on or by pressuring

nomic development

bids. Yet

efforts are not failures.

much

local governmental entities to strengthen their eco-

even

Where

if

material benefits never appear, these organizing

grassroots mobilization has occurred, people have a

stronger comprehension of fundamental political issues and, as important, a trans-

formed understanding of themselves

in relation to those issues.

Organizing

is likely

to

increase political participation and thus strengthen local democracy, educate citizens on
local

and national

sibility.

ings,

issues, nourish leadership,

and

foster solidarity

and collective respon-

Different types of mobilization lead to different sets of experiences, understand-

and resulting
and

among participants.
among low-income rural people

political behaviors

Studying political mobilization

reveals the incen-

democracy in an increasingly global economy. This study
has focused on the concern most central to poor people's lives: their jobs and, more
generally, the condition of the local economy. It shows, first, that the most devastating
economic changes result not from an invisible hand within an optimizing free market,
but from sets of national, state, and local institutions and political decisions. It then
shows that local people can have an impact on these issues, although they must contend
with formidable structures and opponents. Although local organizing cannot compete
with the forces shaping national and global economic policy, it can transform local
politics and is an essential beginning. It is important to note that these local battles are

tives

barriers to true local

indeed only a beginning. 38

The

histories presented here

prove that in no

39

way should

this

type of organizing be

.
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seen as limited to local groups and traditional neighborhood issues. In every case,

people were more than capable of seeing their struggles in a national and international
context and learning to analyze their

own

towns' economies in this framework. The

transformation from the personal and local to the global remains the test of successful
organizing. Small, disadvantaged communities always encounter difficulty in mobiliz-

they neglect to act, they are excluded from the deciExamining systems that enable excluded groups to
achieve a voice in such judgments is central to debates about democracy and power in
contemporary American politics and public policy. In an era of downsizing, deindustrialization, and economic globalization, these questions are more important than ever. $*
ing around economic issues, but

most

sions that

if

affect their lives.
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